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Summary. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a novel architectural
model for cloud network infrastructure, improving resource utilization,
scalability and administration. SDN deployments increasingly rely on
virtual switches executing on commodity operating systems with large
code bases, which are prime targets for adversaries attacking the net-
work infrastructure. We describe and implement TruSDN, a framework
for bootstrapping trust in SDN infrastructure using Intel Software Guard
Extensions (SGX), allowing to securely deploy SDN components and pro-
tect communication between network endpoints. We introduce ephemeral
flow-specific pre-shared keys and propose a novel defense against cuckoo
attacks on SGX enclaves. TruSDN is secure under a powerful adversary
model, with a minor performance overhead.
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1 Introduction
Renewed and widespread interest in virtualization – along with proliferation
of cloud computing – has spurred a series of innovations, allowing cloud ser-
vice providers to deliver on-demand compute, storage and network resources for
highly dynamic workloads. Consequently, more hardware and virtual compo-
nents are added to already large networks, complicating network management.
To help address this, SDN emerged as a novel network architecture model. Sep-
aration of the data and control planes is its core principle, allowing network
operators to implement high-level configuration goals by interacting with a sin-
gle network controller, rather than configuring discrete network components.
The controller applies the configuration to the network edge, i.e. to its global
view of the data plane [11]. Data and control plane separation in SDN chal-
lenges network infrastructure security best practices evolved in the decades since
packet-switched digital network communication gained popularity [15], [21].
In the cloud infrastructure model, SDN allows tenants to configure complex
topologies with rich network functionality, managed by a network controller. The
availability of a global view of the data plane enables advanced controller capa-
bilities – from pre-calculating optimized traffic routing to managing applications
that replace hardware middleboxes. However, these capabilities also make the
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controller a valuable attack target: once compromised, it yields the adversary
complete control over the network [26]. The global view itself is security sensi-
tive: an adversary capable of impersonating network components may distort a
controller’s global view and influence network-wide routing policies [12].
Virtual switches are another category of security sensitive components in
SDN deployments. They execute on commodity operating systems (OS) and are
often assigned the same trust level and privileges as hardware switches – special-
ized network components with compact embedded software [27] or application-
specific integrated circuits. Commodity OS are likely to contain security flaws
which can be exploited to compromise virtual switches. For example, their con-
figuration can be modified to disobey the protocol, breach network isolation
and reroute traffic to a malicious destination or compromise other network edge
elements through lateral attacks. Such risks are accentuated by the extensive
control a cloud provider has over the infrastructure of its tenants.
Security and isolation of tenant infrastructure can be strengthened by con-
fining select SDN components to trusted execution environments (TEE) and
attesting their integrity before provisioning security-sensitive data. TEEs with
strong security guarantees can be built using SGX, a set of recently introduced
extensions to the x86 instruction set architecture and related hardware [1, 17].
Earlier work used SGX to protect computation in cloud environments, by exe-
cuting modified OS instances in SGX enclaves [2] or a data processing framework
in a set of SGX enclaves [32]. However, while both of the above efforts highlighted
the need to secure network communication, they did not address it.
1.1 Contribution
This paper makes the following contributions:
– We present TruSDN, a framework to bootstrap trust in SDN infrastructure.
– We introduce flow-specific pre-shared keys for communication protection.
– We propose a defense against cuckoo attacks [22], based on properties of the
enhanced privacy ID (EPID) scheme [4] used for remote enclave attestation.
– We describe the implementation and a performance evaluation of TruSDN.
1.2 Organization
We introduce the system model in Section 2, describe the adversary model in
Section 3 and the design of TruSDN in Section 4. In Section 5 we provide a
security analysis, describe the prototype implementation and performance eval-
uation in Section 6 and review the related work in Section 7. We discuss future
work in Section 8 and conclude in Section 9.
2 System Model
In this section we describe the SDN architectural model and the SDN deployment
layers. Furthermore, we describe the use of TEEs based on Intel SGX.
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2.1 Software Defined Networking
In this paper we target SDN in infrastructure cloud deployments. The system
model follows the architecture presented in [5] and depicted in Figure 1.
The data plane includes hardware and software switch implementations. Soft-
ware switching is used in cloud deployments due to its scalability and configura-
tion flexibility. Figure 2 illustrates the software switching approaches for commu-
nication between two collocated endpoints. In a typical switch implementation,
its kernel-space component is optimized for forwarding performance, lacks deci-
sion logic and only forwards packets matching rules in its forwarding information
base (FIB) [19]. The FIB comprises packet forwarding rules deployed to satisfy
network administrator goals. Mismatching packets are discarded or redirected to
the control plane through the southbound API. While the data plane uses com-
plementary functionality of both virtual and physical switches, the role of the
latter is often reduced to routing IP-tunneled traffic between hypervisors [24].
In this paper we do not address control of hardware switches and traffic routing
between hosts; we assume that the physical network provides uniform capacity
across hosts, based on e.g. equal-cost multi-path routing [13], such that if multi-
ple equal-cost routes to the same destination exist, they can be discovered and
used to provide load balancing among redundant paths. Overlay networks – e.g.
VLANs or GRE [10] – are used for communication between endpoints. In this
work, we focus exclusively on software switching and use the term “switch” to
denote a virtual, software implementation. We refer to hardware switch imple-
mentations as “hardware switches”.
In the control plane, high-level network operator goals are translated into
discrete routing policies based on the global network view, i.e. a graph represen-
tation of the virtual network topology. The main component of a control plane
is the network controller, which we define as follows:
Definition 1. Network Controller (NC) is a logically centralized component that
manages network communication in a given deployment by updating the FIB
with specific forwarding rules. The NC compiles forwarding rules based on three
inputs: the dynamic global network view, the high-level configuration goals of the
network operator, and the output of the network management applications.
Global network view
Traffic shaper
Network Management Applications
Data Plane
Control Plane
Southbound API (e.g. OpenFlow)
Network Hypervisor
Network Operating System
Virtual Firewall Intrusion Detection System
Fig. 1. The SDN architectural model.
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Fig. 2. Communication paths between col-
located endpoints: (1) virtual switch; (2)
host-local, e.g. native bridging; (3) virtual
queues in the NIC.
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The NC is typically implemented as part of a logically centralized network OS,
which builds and maintains the global network view and may include a net-
work hypervisor, to multiplex network resources among distinct virtual network
deployments.
Southbound API is a set of vendor-agnostic instructions for communication
between data and control planes. It is often limited to flow-based traffic control
of the data plane, with management done through a configuration database [24].
Network operators use network management applications (NMAs), e.g. fire-
walls, traffic shapers, etc., to configure the network using high-level commands.
2.2 Deployment layers
We next describe the deployment layers of SDN infrastructure (Figure 3).
The hardware layer includes infrastructure for data transfer, processing and
storage and is comprised of network hardware (including hardware switches and
communication channels), hardware server platforms and data storage.
The infrastructure layer includes software components for virtualization and
resource provisioning to infrastructure users, referred to as tenants. For network
resources, this layer includes the network hypervisor, which creates network slices
by multiplexing physical network infrastructure between tenants. Infrastructure
providers expose a slice (i.e. a quota) of network resources to the tenants.
The service layer includes components controlled by tenants. Network com-
ponents operated by tenants are grouped into network domains, comprising the
virtual network resources and topologies that logically belong to the same orga-
nizational unit and network slice, and perform related tasks or provide a com-
mon service. The network hypervisor ensures that a tenant’s control plane can
only control switches in its own slice. Within their slice, tenants have exhaus-
tive creation, destruction and configuration privileges over components, such as
instances of switches, the NC, NMAs and network domains. We define three
logical communication segments (Figure 4): between the network controller and
switches (α segments); among the switches on each host (β segments); between
host-local switches and network endpoints (γ segments).
The user layer includes endpoint consumers of network services, e.g. virtu-
alization guests, containers and applications in a network domain.
2.3 Trusted Execution Environments
The proposed solution relies on TEEs that both provide strong isolation and
allow remote code and data integrity attestation. Such a TEE can be created
using Intel SGX enclaves (introduced in [1, 17]) during OS runtime and relies
for its security on a trusted computing base (TCB) of code and data loaded
at build time, processor firmware and processor hardware. At build time, the
CPU measures the loaded code, data and memory page layout. At initialization
time, the CPU produces a final measurement, after which the enclave becomes
immutable and cannot be externally modified. The CPU maintains the mea-
surement throughout the enclave’s lifetime to later assert the integrity of the
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enclave contents. Processor firmware is the root of trust (ROT) of an enclave.
It prevents access to the enclave’s memory segment by either the platform OS,
other enclaves, or other external agents. Enclaves operate in a separate mem-
ory region inaccessible to non-enclave processes, called the enclave page cache
(EPC). Multiple mutually distrusting enclaves can operate on the platform. The
processor enforces separation of memory access among enclaves based on the
layout in the EPC map. Program execution within an enclave is transparent to
both the underlying OS and other enclaves.
Remote attestation allows an enclave to provide integrity guarantees of its
contents [1]. For this, the platform produces an attestation assertion with in-
formation about the identity of the enclave and details of its state (e.g. the
mode of the software environment, associated data, and a cryptographic bind-
ing to the platform TCB making the assertion). For intra-platform attestation
(i.e. between enclaves on the same platform), the reporting enclave (reporter)
invokes the EREPORT instruction to create a REPORT structure with the assertion
and calculate a message authentication code (MAC), using a report key, known
only to the target enclave (target) and the CPU. The structure contains a user
data field, where the reporter can store a hash of the auxiliary data provided.
The target recomputes the MAC with its report key to verify the authenticity
of the structure, and compares the hash in the user data with the hash of the
auxiliary data, to verify its integrity. Enclaves then use the auxiliary data to
establish a secure communication channel. For inter-platform attestation the re-
mote verifier first sends a challenge to the enclave platform, where the challenge
is complemented with the indentity of a quoting enclave (QE) and forwarded to
the reporter, which appends the challenge response to the REPORT and attests
itself to the QE. The QE verifies the structure, signs it with a platform-specific
key using the enhanced privacy ID group signature scheme (EPID) [4] and re-
turns it to the verifier, to check the authenticity of the signature and the report
itself [1]. The use of the EPID scheme is part of the SGX implementation and
allows to maintain the privacy of the platform which hosts the enclave.
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3 Adversary Model
We now describe the adopted adversary model, as well as the core security
assumptions on which we base our design. The adversary model we adopt can
be described by the capabilities of the adversary at the network and platform
levels respectively (overview in Table 1).
3.1 Network infrastructure
For SDN infrastructure, we adopt the adversary model introduced in [7] and
extended with SDN-specific attack vectors in [21]. We assume a powerful adver-
sary (Adv), which controls the cloud deployment network infrastructure; it can
intercept, record, forge, drop and replay any message on the network, and is only
limited by the constraints of the employed cryptographic methods. Particularly,
the Adv may forge messages that do not match any of the rules installed in
the FIB. Furthermore the Adv may create own instances of switches and launch
Sybil attacks [8] and launch other types of topology poisoning attacks [12] to
distort the global network view. Finally, Adv can store arbitrary quantities of
intercepted communication and attempt its decryption with encryption keys in-
tercepted or leaked at a later point. It can analyze the traffic patterns in the
network through passive probing and may disrupt or degrade network connec-
tivity to achieve its goals. We explicitly exclude Denial-of-Service attacks on the
SDN infrastructure.
3.2 Platform
For platform security, we consider a powerful adversary, similar to [2, 32], that
may control the entire software stack in the cloud provider’s infrastructure.
On the hardware level, we assume the processor is correctly implemented and
remains uncompromised; furthermore, we assume a reliable and secure source of
random numbers (which can be provided by the CPU). Adv has full control
Table 1. Summary of the Adv capabilities in relation to the adversary model.
Type Network Platform
Included Intercept, record, forge, drop,
replay messages;
Analyze the traffic patterns;
Disrupt or degrade network connectivity;
Launch topology poisoning attacks
Control non-processor hardware;
Control software stack OS, hypervisor;
Pause execution;
Deploy arbitrary software components;
“Cuckoo attack”: Forward function calls
to compromised SGX enclaves;
Return arbitrary values to system calls
Not included,
mitigations known
Side-channels: cache-collision,
controlled channel;
Attacks on shielded execution;
Excplicitly
excluded
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks Side-channels: power analysis; DoS
attacks
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over the remaining hardware, including memory, I/O devices, periferials, etc.
Similarly, Adv fully controls the software stack, including the platform OS and
the hypervisor. This implies that Adv may pause indefinitely the execution of
the code in the TEE and return arbitrary values in response to OS system
calls. However, a deployment orchestrator and NC execute under tenant control,
on a fully trusted platform and software stack. We exclude side-channel attacks.
While some side-channel attacks – e.g. timing, cache-collision, controlled channel
attacks – can be mitigated through software modification [35], preventing other
side-channel attacks – such as power analysis – requires hardware modifications.
An Adv with advanced capabilities may leverage its full control over the OS to
utilize the class of known attacks on shielded execution; while we do not address
such attacks, they have known countermeasures [6, 2].
SGX, similar to other trusted computing solutions, is vulnerable to cuckoo
attacks [22]. In one attack scenario, malware on the target platform forwards the
messages intended for the local SGX enclave (SGXEL ) to a remote enclave under
Adv ’s physical control (malicious enclave, SGXEM ). Having physical access to
SGXEM , Adv can apply hardware attacks to violate its security guarantees. As
a result, Adv controls all communication between the verifier and SGXEL , with
access to an oracle that provides all of the answers a benign SGXE would, but
without its expected security properties.
Briefly, the adversary model for platform security largely matches the remote
administrator capabilities of an infrastructure cloud provider.
4 Solution Description
In this section we present TruSDN, a framework for bootstrapping trust in SDN
deployments. Its goal is to allow tenants to securely deploy computing tasks
and create virtualized network infrastructure deployments, given the adversary
model defined in Section 3. To satisfy this goal, the framework must satisfy the
following set of requirements:
– Authentication: communication in the domain must the authenticated, and a
secure enrollment mechanism for data plane components must be in place.
– Topology integrity: the NC must be protected from network components that
attempt to distort the global network view.
– Component integrity: integrity of switches must be attested prior to enrollment
and the cryptographic material required for their network access must be
protected with a hardware ROT.
– Confidentiality protection of domain secrets: network domain secrets – such
as VPN session keys – should not be revealed to the Adv .
– Protected network communication: network communication in the tenant do-
main must be confidentiality and integrity protected.
4.1 TruSDN overview
We begin by introducing the building blocks of TruSDN (Figure 5).
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Trusted Execution Environments: TruSDN uses TEEs that guarantee secure ex-
ecution in the given adversary model, assuming the CPU and executed code are
correctly implemented.
Protected Compute Tasks: Security sensitive compute tasks (CT) are deployed
in TEEs. Such tasks include all operations that tenants aim to protect from the
Adv . However, CTs rely on the untrusted OS for I/O and support functionality.
Protected Data Plane: Switches are deployed in TEEs – they route traffic be-
tween CTs according to forwarding rules communicated through secure channels
and maintained in the FIB. The FIB of the switches, and the key material nec-
essary to establish the secure channels are stored in TEEs.
Attested code in TEEs: An orchestrator under tenant control attests the TEEs
during network infrastructure deployment, to ensure integrity of the deployed
code and data before keys or key material are provisioned to the respective TEE.
In a typical deployment scenario, the tenant invokes an orchestrator to deploy
a switch bootstrap application on the hosts in the tenant’s domain. The bootstrap
application invokes a host-local SGX driver to build an SGX enclave containing
a switch. Next, the orchestrator attests the created enclave (as described in
Section 2.3) prior to enrolling the switch with the NC. The orchestrator uses the
enclave’s public key from the attestation quote to securely transfer the enclave-
specific integrity and confidentiality protection session keys used to establish a
protected communication channel between the NC and the TEE. Finally, the
NC communicates any remaining security-sensitive payload to the created TEE,
e.g. the initial FIB. Next, CTs are deployed in TEEs on the host and the switch
forwards packets between the CTs, matching them against the rules in the FIB.
Mismatching packets are forwarded to the NC, which may update the FIB with
new rules. For clarity, we assume the orchestrator and NC are collocated on
a platform under tenant control and view both as a single component, further
referred to as “NC”.
Secure Communication: TruSDN protects the communication between CTs, be-
tween switches and the NC, as well as among the switches, in the above adversary
model. Communication security is ensured using confidentiality and integrity
protection keys provisioned to authenticated network components and endpoints
executing in TEEs. Furthermore, TruSDN leverages SDN principles to introduce
a novel mechanism – per-flow communication protection using ephemeral flow-
specific pre-shared keys (PSKs).
Host 1
Compute Task 1.1
TEE1.1
Compute Task 1.2
TEE1.2 Host 2
Compute Task 2.1
TEE2.1
Compute Task 2.2
TEE2.2
Network
Controller
TEE2.3
Protected compute tasks
TEE1.3
Protected data plane
Trusted Execution EnviromentsSecure Communication Channels
O
rc
h
e
st
ra
to
r
Attested code 
in TEEs
Fig. 5. Illustration of core building blocks of TruSDN.
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Table 2. Summary of keys used in the TruSDN framework.
Key Created by Access Usage
Kαi NC NC, switch Enclave-specific session, segment α
Kβj NC NC , switch Domain-specific session, segment β
K′ NC NC, switch Ephemeral session key
K′′ NC NC, switch Ephemeral MAC key
EKpki switch public Public key of the switch enclave
EKski switch switch Private key of the switch enclave
CKpki CT public Public key of the compute task
CKski CT CT Private key of the compute task
QEpk vendor public Public key of the quoting enclave
QEsk vendor vendor, QE Private key of the quoting enclave
SKγij NC NC, CTi, CTj Ephemeral flow-specific pre-shared key
4.2 Cryptographic Primitives
We now define the cryptographic primitives and notations used in the remainder
of this paper. We denote by {0, 1}n the set of all binary strings of length n, and
by {0, 1}∗ the set of all finite binary strings. In a set U , we refer to the ith
element as ui, and use the following notation for cryptographic operations:
– Given an arbitrary message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, we denote by c = Enc (K,m) a sym-
metric encryption of m using the secret key K ∈ {0, 1}∗. The corresponding
symmetric decryption operation is m = Dec(K, c) = Dec(K,Enc(K,m)).
– We denote by pk/sk a public/private key pair for a public key encryption
scheme. We denote by c = Encpk (m) the encryption of message m with the
public key pk, and the decryption by m = Decsk(c) = Decsk(Encpk(m)).
– We denote a digital signature over a message m by σ = Signsk(m) and the
corresponding verification of a digital signature by ν = Verifypk(m,σ), where
ν = 1 if the signature is valid and ν = 0 otherwise.
– We denote a Message Authentication Code (MAC) using a secret key K over
a message m by µ = MAC(K,m).
We next describe key sharing and communication protection mechanisms on
the identified logical segments. Table 2 summarizes the keys used by TruSDN.
4.3 SDN Trust Bootstrapping and Secure Communication
The first step in deploying a TruSDN infrastructure is to launch a set of trusted
switches for connectivity and topology building. The NC requests the creation
of switch enclaves to deploy switches in TEEs on hosts in its domain. Switches
are deployed based on parameters provided by the NC in plaintext (application
code and configuration). Next, the NC attests the integrity of switch enclaves
and only enrolls the successfully attested ones (Figure 6). A TEE Ei is attested
following the protocol introduced in [1]. With TruSDN however, the reporter
generates an enclave-specific public-private keypair and submits its public key
EKpki along with the attestation data; a hash of the public key is stored in the
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BE NC API E QE
1.n
2.QEi, n
3.m = REPORT, EKpki
4.σ = Signsk(m)
5. σ, m
TruSDN.ObtainQuote Obtain Enclave Quote
6.Verifypk(m,σ)
ν
7.Attest Emi
Enrollment message
ack
8. Updated Global View
TruSDN.Enrol Attest and Enrol Enclave
Fig. 6. TruSDN enclave attestation and enrollment: (1.) Random nonce n is (2.) sup-
plemented with the host QE identity; (3.) Quote m produced by the enclave is (4.)
signed by the QE. (6.) The verifier checks the signature of the QE, (7.) attests the
integrity of the enclave and (8.) only enrolls the enclave upon success. BE: back-end.
user data field. The switch enclave is only enrolled to the global network view
if its reported state matches the one expected by NC.
Having attested enclave Ei, NC communicates an Enrollment message (Ta-
ble 3) with the enclave-specific pre-shared key Kαi and domain-specific pre-
shared key Kβj , encrypted with an ephemeral key K
′
i. Switches within a domain
use Kβj to protect communication on β segments. The NC appends a MAC of
the message calculated with K ′′i and encrypts the keys K
′
i, K
′′
i with EK
pk
i .
Once switches are deployed and enrolled, tenants may configure the network
topology using the NC to update the switch FIBs. Communication on α segments
– e.g. FIB updates or unmatched packets forwarded to the NC – is protected
using the session key Kαi (e.g. using TLS [9]), which never leaves the TEE.
Similarly, a secure channel is established among the switches within the
same domain, using the pre-shared key Kβj , to protect communication between
switches on different hosts (e.g. TEEs 1.2 and 2.3 in Figure 5). Kβj never leaves
the TEEs, has a limited validity time and is periodically redeployed by the NC.
Table 3. Enrollment message sent by the NC upon switch enrollment.
m = Enc(K′i, (K
α
i , K
β
j )) µ = MAC(K
′′
i ,m) Enc(EK
pk
i , (K
′
i, K
′′
i )
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On β segments, traffic may traverse multiple hardware switches, forwarded to
the host over tunnels deployed on top of a standard routing protocol (e.g. [13]).
Next, the tenant may deploy CTs in TEEs and attest their integrity using the
very same scheme and principles as for the switch deployment described above.
The CTs and the network controller use the Enrollment message to establish a
secure communication channel (e.g. TLS).
Once the NC has deployed and attested the TEEs with switches and CTs,
intra-host communication (i.e. between two CT enclaves on the same host)
is straightforward (Figure 7): when a packet m sent from C1 (e.g. a TLS
ClientHello message) reaches the local host switch A, it attempts to match
m against a FIB entry; if no suitable flow rule f is present, the switch forwards
Enc(KαA,m) to NC, which processes the packet, generates and deploys on the
CTs C1, C2 a flow-specific pre-shared key SKγ12 and finally updates the switch
FIB with f , after which steps 2 and 3 are ignored; once the FIB is updated, the
switch forwards m to C2, which continues the message exchange and uses SKγ12
to protect the communication with C1, using e.g. TLS with a PSK ciphersuite[9].
Communication between CTs C1 and C3 deployed on distinct hosts is sim-
ilar, with the only notable difference that the NC updates the FIB of the local
switches on both hosts where C1, C3 are deployed.
In the above scenarios TruSDN leverages two aspects of the SDN model – (1)
the deployment has a central authority (the NC) and (2) the first packet of a flow
is forwarded to the central authority – to deliver on demand ephemeral PSKs to
communication endpoints. This allows to relax the need for high-quality entropy
being available to CTs (a known issue in virtualized environments [29]). Fur-
thermore, this approach ensures communication security without compromising
packet visibility – having control over the keys used to protect communication
between the CTs allows the NC to maintain fine-grained insight into the traffic.
4.4 Preventing Cuckoo Attacks
To prevent cuckoo attacks [22], we propose a solution that leverages crypto-
graphic properties of the EPID scheme used by the QE [4] and the SIGn and
C1 Switch A C2 NC
1. m
2. Enc(KαA,m)
4. Enc(CKpk1 , SK
γ
12)
5. Enc(CKpk2 , SK
γ
12)
3. Enc(KαA, f)
6. m
7. Handshake protocol continued, SKγ12 as PSK
Fig. 7. Intra-host communication with TruSDN.
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Message Authentication (SIGMA) protocol [34], which are both part of the Intel
SGX implementation. The EPID scheme supports two signature modes: fully
anonymous mode – the verifier cannot associate a given signature with a partic-
ular member of the group; pseudo-anonymous mode – the verifier can determine
whether it has verified the platform previously. The unlinkability property dis-
tinguished in the two modes depends on the chosen base. A signature includes a
pseudonym Bf , where B is the base chosen for a signature and revealed during
the signature; f is unique per member and private. For a random base R, the
pseudonym is Rf – in this case the signatures are unlinkable. For a name base,
the pseudonym is Nf , where N is the name of the verifier – in this case the signa-
tures remain unlinkable for different verifiers, while signatures with a common
N can be linked. For privacy reasons, the EPID scheme currently implemented
in Intel SGX accepts name base pseudonyms only from verifiers authorized by
the EPID authority [30], which is done by provisioning qualified verifiers with an
X.509 certificate – e.g. an intermediate certification authority (CA) certificate –
signed by the EPID authority acting as root CA.
We propose the following algorithm to prevent cuckoo attacks. At deployment
time, the EPID authority issues, to an authorized verifier VP , an intermediate
CA verifier certificate for the platforms in the cloud provider’s data center. Next,
VP attests its platforms following the SIGMA protocol and publishes a list of
resulting platform EPID signatures and the signature name base, BNP . To guard
against cuckoo attacks, tenants first request VP to issue an X.509 certificate
and enable them to become authorized verifiers. Next, tenants choose the same
pseudonym base BNP (and a private f), follow the SIGMA protocol, and verify that
the resulting signature is linkable to a signature in the published list. The cloud
provider has multiple tools to protect platform privacy and prevent untrusted
tenants from fingerprinting the platform infrastructure, e.g. limiting the validity
of issued certificates, changing the name base, etc. Considering that the EPID
scheme is currently not implemented in the SGX emulation software we used for
prototyping, we intend to describe the implementation of the above algorithm
in a follow-up report.
5 Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the security properties of the proposed framework in
the adversary model described in Section 3. On the network level, many of the
Adv capabilities are thwarted by first authenticating the switches deployed on
the data plane, as well as the network edge (i.e. the compute tasks that generate
or receive the network traffic), in combination with confidentiality and integrity
protection of the traffic on the three identified segments. Authenticating the net-
work components prevents topology poisoning attacks (a countermeasure men-
tioned in [12]), while confidentiality and integrity protection of all of the network
traffic in the deployment prevents the Adv from either learning the contents of
the exchanged packets or successfully forging packets. The Adv may in this case
still intercept and record messages. However, collecting encrypted traffic does
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not yield the Adv any more information about the contents of the exchanged
packets. Similarly, the Adv does not gain an advantage by simply dropping or
replaying messages, since these actions would at most simply reduce the chan-
nel capacity (as would the ability of the Adv to disrupt network connectivity).
Finally, the proposed framework does not prevent the Adv analyzing the traffic
patterns and does not prevent it from fingerprinting the components of the de-
ployment, making it vulnerable to rule scanning and denial of service attacks.
While the goals of TruSDN did not include this, such traffic analysis could be
prevented using anti-fingerprinting techniques, as proposed in [3].
On the platform level, the security of the proposed framework relies to a
large extent on the security properties of Intel SGX enclaves. This allows to
protect the execution of switches and network edge components deployed in
TEEs from the capabilities of an Adv controlling non-processor hardware, the
software stack of the OS and the hypervisor. Similarly, pausing execution of
switches executing in TEEs, while possible, would have no further effect than
degrading network connectivity, already discussed above. While the Adv may
attempt to deploy own arbitrary components on the data plane or the network
edge in order to launch Sybill attacks, the integrity of such components would
not be successfully attested, unless they are identical to legitimate components,
which are assumed to be executing correctly – rendering Sybill behavior impos-
sible. The Adv is prevented from launching cuckoo attacks by enabling tenants
to verify the platforms, as described in Section 4.4. As presented in Table 1,
several relevant classes of attacks are not addressed by TruSDN, but have known
mitigations, namely cache-collision, controlled channel and attacks on shielded
execution (addressed in [35, 32]). The capability of the Adv to return arbitrary
values to system calls, while not addressed in this work, can be mitigated by a
validation component as described in [2].
6 Implementation and Evaluation
We now describe the implementation and evaluation of TruSDN.
6.1 TruSDN Implementation
The TruSDN prototype deployment follows the design presented in Section 4 and
is illustrated in Figure 8. Host 1 and Host 2 are instances of Ubuntu OS 15.04.
In each instance, we deployed Linux Containers1, similarly based on Ubuntu OS
15.04. Containers create an environment with own process and network space,
implemented using namespaces, with a distinct user ID, network stack, mount
points, file systems, processes, inter-process communication, and hostname. We
chose containers to facilitate prototype implementation, using their lightweight
process isolation. Containers are part of the untrusted OS and this implementa-
tion choice is orthogonal to the security of TruSDN. Compute tasks are deployed
1 Linux Containers Project Website: https://linuxcontainers.org/
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Fig. 8. Prototype deployment of TruSDN
in TEEs created using SGX enclaves (Figure 8): enclaves E1, E2, E4, E5 are
placed respectively within containers C1, C2, C3, C4. The switches are deployed
in TEEs created using SGX enclaves (enclaves E3, E6 in Figure 8).
Considering that platforms with hardware and software support for SGX were
not publicly available at the time of writing, we used OpenSGX [14] to emulate
the TEEs. It is a software SGX emulator and a platform for SGX development,
implemented using binary translation of QEMU and emulating Intel SGX hard-
ware components at instruction level. It includes emulated hardware and OS
components, enclave program loader, the OpenSGX user libraries, debugging
and performance monitoring support. The emulator allows to implement, de-
bug, and evaluate SGX applications, but does not support binary compatibility
with Intel SGX. Furthermore, OpenSGX does not implement all instructions,
e.g. debugging instructions. While OpenSGX does not provide security guran-
tees, it allows us to obtain performance estimates for the proposed approach.
We used mbedTLS2 v1.3.11 (distributed with the emulator) for attestation of
the SGX enclaves. We used OpenSSL v1.0.2d (distributed with the emulator)
to set up protected communication channels between the CT enclaves and the
local switches, and among switches within the same domain.
An SDN network controller is deployed in a third instance (Host 3 ). We used
the Ryu3 SDN framework, due to its flexibility and versatile APIs.
6.2 TruSDN Evaluation
We now analyze the performance impact, present evaluation results and discuss
aspects that cannot be measured with the current prototype.
Sources of Performance Impact TruSDN introduces several potential sources
of performance impact (Table 4). We distinguish between transient performance
overhead, which occurs occasionally (e.g. TLS key negotiation) and continuous
performance overhead, present throughout the infrastructure operation. We do
not consider the one-time cost of infrastructure deployment, e.g. provisioning
the software, attesting TEEs and enrolling the components.
2 mbed TLS project website https://tls.mbed.org/
3 Ryu SDN framework: https://osrg.github.io/ryu/
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Table 4. Sources and types of performance overhead in TruSDN
Source Type Clarification
TLS negotiation all segments transient Negotiate session keys for TLS
PSK distribution transient Distribute PSK for γ segments
TLS protection all segments continuous Overhead induced by TLS
Compute task execution in TEEs continuous Overhead induced by TEE
Switch execution in TEEs continuous Overhead induced by TEE
Measured Performance Impact To evaluate the performance impact, we
measured the footprint of establishing TLS sessions on α and γ segments. We
used iperf, openssl s time and an own Ryu application (Table 5).
TLS overhead on the α segment: We measured the round-trip latency of packets
sent in plaintext and with TLS, over 1000 tests, each request sending messages
of 100 bytes with the 80 bit OpenFlow header. Furthermore, we measured the
data transfer rates for plaintext and TLS communication. Use of TLS increased
total transfer time by 14.2% and reduced the transfer rate by 15.98%.
Delay on γ segment As mentioned above, the first packet of the flow is inter-
cepted by the switch and forwarded to the NC in a packet in message [23].
At this point the NC processes the flow and installs a flow rule on the switch.
TruSDN extends this procedure by generating and distributing to the commu-
nicating CTs a pre-shared key, to be used for communication protection. Since
this must be done prior to both forwarding the message to the destination CT
and installing the flow rule, generating and distributing the PSK would nor-
mally delay the installation of the flow rule and increase the latency of the first
packet (all subsequent packets are forwarded according to the flow rule). To
measure the introduced delay, we have sequentially established 1000 TLS ses-
sions between compute tasks C1 and C2 (according to Figure 8). After each TLS
session, we flushed the installed flow rules (with ovs-ofctl del-flows br0),
Table 5. Summary of performance evaluation of TruSDN
Data Minimum Maximum Mean Median Stddev
Total transfer time, ms 0.4 1.1 0.66 0.7 0.07
Total transfer time w. TruSDN, ms 0.5 7.1 0.8 0.8 0.22
TruSDN overhead, total transfer time 21.2% 14.2%
Transfer rate, bytes per second 1225 2095 1595 1583 98.07
Transfer rate w. TruSDN, bytes per second 919 1589 1338 1330 64.86
TruSDN overhead, transfer rate 16.11% 15.98%
First packet latency γ 1.53 6.50 3.48 3.38 0.42
First packet latency γ w. TruSDN 3.35 10.7 5.37 5.14 0.93
TruSDN overhead, first packet latency 54.31% 52.07%
TLS handshake, ms 36.53 77.72 67.97 67.48 7.42
TLS handshake w. TruSDN, ms 52.35 76.44 67.15 66.53 3.93
TruSDN overhead, TLS handshake -2.21% -2.41%
Key generation NC, ms 0.11 0.51 0.178 0.16 0.04
Key distribution γ, ms 0.37 1.06 0.54 0.53 0.08
Key total γ, ms 0.50 1.30 0.71 0.7 0.11
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which resulted in a packet in message upon each new session. The latency of
the first packet is shown in Figure 9, and compared against the latency of a first
packet without the TruSDN extension.
The induced delay is primarily caused by two operations performed by the
NC: generating a 256-bit PSK and distributing it to the CTs. Figure 10 displays a
fine-grained picture of the induced delay. Key generation lasted on average 0.178
ms, while key distribution on average 0.54 ms (Table 5). We remind that the test
environment is fully virtualized and posit that overhead of key generation can
be reduced in a production environment, either by using pre-generated keys or
with specialized hardware (e.g. crypto processors). In our tests, the duration of
establishing a TLS session with ephemeral flow-specific pre-shared keys using the
PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA cipher suite was 2.41% less compared to the use of e.g.
ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256. Thus, TruSDN enables flexible use of pre-shared
keys, which in turn reduces the duration of the TLS handshake, by avoiding
expensive public key cryptographic operations [16]. Moreover, it reduces the
CPU utilization for key derivation in CTs, at the cost of a minimal flow rule
installation delay. The above approach may be applicable to other protocols.
For example, none of the differences between the datagram TLS (DTLS) and
TLS protocols specified in [28] indicate that the above approach is incompatible
with DTLS. We leave further investigation for future work.
Unmeasured Performance Overhead Implementing TEEs with OpenSGX
limits the level of detail when it comes to performance evaluation, since: (a)
the OpenSGX emulator is not binary compatible with Intel SGX [14]; (b) in
its current version4 and unlike Intel’s description of SGX [1], OpenSGX has
yet to implement support multithreaded applications5. Thus, a fully accurate
measurement on TruSDN performance cannot be done until Intel SGX hardware
and software is made available. However, we believe our experiments yield a fair
picture of the expected performance impact.
4 Commit e0713c7 on https://github.com/sslab-gatech/opensgx
5 Issue #34 on https://github.com/sslab-gatech/opensgx/issues/34
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7 Related work
Adversary models: Kreutz et al. presented a list of attack vectors in SDN [15]
(forged traffic flows, vulnerabilities in switches and NCs, lack of trust estab-
lishment mechanisms, etc.). However, only part of the described attack vectors
are exclusively relevant to SDN networks and no specific solutions are proposed.
Work in [21] introduced an adversary model, attack vectors, and security require-
ments towards multi-tenant SDN infrastructure, highlighting the need to limit
the effect of NC vulnerabilities, protect internal SDN communication, verify in-
tegrity of SDN components prior to enrollment, and enforce policy and quota
isolation. TruSDN addresses several of the attack vectors described in [15, 21].
Secure SDN controllers: The “NOX” network OS [11] presents NMAs with a cen-
tralized programming model, allowing to operate with higher-level abstractions
and apply graph processing algorithms to compute paths. It consists of several
controller processes which use the global view for network management decisions
and update switch FIBs over the OpenFlow API [18]. FortNOX [25] extends NOX
with role-based authorization (RBA) and enforcement of security constraints. It
translates high-level threats into flow rules to handle suspicious traffic as well as
detects rule conflicts, resolves them depending on the authorization of the rule
requestor and enforces least privilege authorization. Neither NOX nor FortNOX
address malicious network components and Sybill attacks, addressed by TruSDN.
“Rosemary” NOS [33] uses NMA sandboxing to improve network resilience, by
launching each NMA in a separate process context with access to the required
libraries, along with a resource monitor to supervise NMA compliance. It does
not address data plane security; TruSDN complements it and creates a founda-
tion for trusted deployment of a secure NOS. TopoGuard [12] detects network
topology poisoning and mitigates this through port property management, net-
work edge probing and verification of topology updates. TruSDN complements
this by verifying the integrity of switches prior to enrollment into the topology.
Software Guard Extensions: SGX was introduced in [17] with a description of
the software model, extensions to the x86 ISA and hardware modifications for
isolated execution; work in [1] described CPU based attestation. SGX-based
solutions in a cloud setting are first described in [2, 32]. “Haven”[2] is a modified
version of Windows 8 OS ported to an SGX enclave, evaluated with Apache
Web Server and SQL Server using synthetic data sets. It includes a mechanism
to protect the enclave from a malicious kernel and a semantically secure data
store protecting data and file metadata confidentiality against malicious hosts.
TruSDN protects network communication for a similar adversary model. While
we deploy compute tasks in SGX enclave-based TEEs, the work in [2] is largely
complementary, and similar “Haven”-like OSs could be used.
“VC3” [32] is a Map-Reduce deployment using SGX enclaves. Map and reduce
functions are compiled into private (encrypted) code and public code implement-
ing key exchange and job execution protocols. Code is initialized in enclaves and
attested by the users. Public code performs the key exchange, decrypts the pri-
vate code and runs the job execution protocol. To defend against cuckoo attacks,
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cloud quoting enclaves are created on each platform in the cloud provider data
centers, to “countersign” quotes produced by the QE. The approach is largely
complementary to protecting communication between CTs with TruSDN. How-
ever, the proposed defense against cuckoo attacks increases the complexity of
the attestation protocol and does not prevent Adv from exploiting a compro-
mised cloud QE outside of the physically secure datacenter perimeter. Instead,
the approach described in Section 4.4 leverages the cryptographic properties of
EPID scheme, without modifying the attestation protocol.
8 Future Work
Along with security guarantees, the use of Intel SGX imposes limitations on
TruSDN. Further performance evaluation may be done once software and hard-
ware support for Intel SGX becomes available; moreover, we note several security
limitations. Controlled-channel attacks [35] are a novel type of side-channel at-
tacks allowing the OS to extract data from protected applications. They were
successfully applied to “Haven” [2] and TruSDN could also be vulnerable; how-
ever, we explicitly excluded such attacks from the adversary model. Known mit-
igations are: rewriting applications to decouple memory access patterns from
sensitive data, prohibiting paging by the OS, or obfuscating memory access pat-
terns [35]. Another limitation stems from the reliance on the platform vendor,
which could leak QEsk, to create a “deniable back-door” and allow person-in-
the-middle attacks on attestation [31]. This challenge remains unaddressed.
In future work we aim to integrate TruSDN with other approaches to cloud
infrastructure security, such as in [20], to provide a complete framework for
secure cloud infrastructure deployments in the given adversarial model.
9 Conclusion
We described, implemented and evaluated TruSDN – a framework for bootstrap-
ping trust in SDN infrastructure. It isolates network endpoints and switches in
SGX enclaves, remotely attests their integrity, and establishes secure commu-
nication channels. We leveraged the principles of SDN to introduce ephemeral
flow-specific PSK distributed at flow creation, which reduce the overhead of key
derivation and reduce the total time to establish protected channels, at the cost
of a minor delay in the flow rule installation. Finally, we leveraged the properties
of the EPID scheme to propose an improved approach to prevent cuckoo attacks.
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